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Responding to Environmental Risk: A
Pluralistic Perspective
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL*

LIMA, Peru, Jan. 5 (Reuters) - The International Committee of the Red Cross has been providing cigarettes for the
smokers among the hostages being held by Marxist guerrillas [at the Japanese embassy in Peru], and other hostages have insisted on having non-smoking areas. 'We are
taking in cigarettes, both Western and Japanese,' said
Ronald Bigler, a Red Cross spokesman. 'We are trying to
help the hostages make it through the day, to ease the
ordeal.' But the Red Cross's supply of cigarettes to the hostages - along with food, water and fresh clothes - may have

annoyed as many captives as it saved from withdrawal
symptoms. Nonsmokers among the hostages insisted on
establishing smoking and non-smoking areas, said Carlos
Aquino Rodriguez, a hostage who was freed on Dec. 22.1
Throughout history, our species has been forced to confront a multiplicity of perils, including many generated by fellow humans and others of natural origin. Wars, famines, and
natural disasters threaten health in ways that are immediate
and obvious. Today, humans also are concerned over far less
conspicuous risks, such as the long-term health effects of exposures to toxic substances. Even hostages held by terrorists
now deem it only reasonable that they be shielded from the
* Professor of Law, Robert Stanton Scholar & Director, Environmental
Law Program, University of Maryland School of Law. This essay is based on a
transcript of a presentation made at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools on January 6, 1997. The author would like to
thank Rachel Schowalter, Apple Chapman, L. Elizabeth Coco and Yvette Pena
for research assistance.
1. Non-smoking Sections for Hostages, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 6, 1997, at
A4.
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risk and annoyance of exposure to second-hand smoke, as
noted above.
Environmental law's explosive growth is a product of
public demand for protection against environmental risks.
While the regulatory infrastructure erected by these laws remains relatively young, recently it has come under unprecedented attack. Critics argue that contemporary regulatory
priorities are seriously misplaced, wasting enormous resources responding to relatively trivial risks due to public
alarmism. 2 They recommend giving greater decisionmaking
authority to experts insulated from public pressure, 3 requiring more detailed risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses
as a prerequisite to regulation, and limiting or preempting
common law liability for certain environmental risks. 4
These criticisms have been debated extensively elsewhere, 5 and it is not the purpose of this essay to repeat this
debate. Instead this essay articulates a more pluralistic vision of regulatory policy that respects the historical roots of
environmental law and the complementary relationship between regulation, common law liability and market forces. It
discusses how the contemporary regulatory state emerged after the common law proved inadequate to control risks of
widely dispersed, latent harm in the face of inevitable scientific uncertainty. Rather than imposing more detailed analytical thresholds that would return regulatory policy to a
common law model, environmental policy should embrace
preventative regulation while cultivating more flexible regulatory standards that harness the power of liability and mar2. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993).
3. See Stephen Breyer, Foreword: Beyond the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U.
ENvTL. L. J. 251, 252 (1995).
4. See, e.g., Peter W. Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of
Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985).
5. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Futureof Environmental Policy, UNIV. CHI. LEGAL FORUM (forthcoming 1997); David A.
Wirth and Ellen K Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1857 (1995);
Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247 (1996); Lisa Heinzerling, PoliticalScience, 62 UNIV.
CHI. L. REV. 449 (1995).
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ket forces as mechanisms for controlling risk. The essay
identifies recent trends that suggest that regulatory policy is
beginning to move in this direction.
I.

From the Common Law to the Contemporary
Regulatory State

Federal regulation now has taken center stage in society's efforts to protect human health from exposure to environmental risks. Most of the laws that require the6
establishment of regulatory standards are of recent origin.
During the last three decades an enormous volume of federal
regulatory legislation was adopted in response to the public's
desire to minimize involuntary exposure to risk. This goal,
which has been pursued relatively consistently across broad
(and diverse) swaths of public policy, is at the root of much
federal environmental regulation. It also is consistent with
the common law's emphasis on protecting against foreseeable
harm. The rise of the modern regulatory state is largely a
product of the difficulties faced by the common law in responding to risks of widely dispersed, latent harm, such as
the harms caused by environmental pollutants and toxins.
Uncertainty is the very essence of the concept of risk, for
risk involves harm that occurs in a probable fashion, affecting
some, but not all of those exposed to a particular substance or
activity. The pervasiveness of uncertainty concerning the ultimate effects of environmental pollutants and toxins is the
primary reason why the contemporary regulatory state displaced the common law as the first line of defense for public
health. The common law's requirement of individualized
proof of causal injury is very difficult to satisfy in cases where
environmental pollutants cause widely dispersed, latent
harm.
Early in this century, the Supreme Court was called
upon to umpire disputes concerning egregious interstate air
and water pollution problems applying the federal common
6. For a history of the enactment of federal environmental legislation see
Robert V. Percival, EnvironmentalFederalism: HistoricalRoots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1160 (1995).
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law of nuisance. In a case where a single massive source of
air pollution had dramatically and visibly damaged the surrounding landscape, proof of causal injury was not a major
problem. 7 Yet, when the Justices became involved in adjudicating interstate disputes over the effects of raw sewage disposal, they became acutely aware of their inability to serve as
a kind of judicial Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).8
In a few rare cases, federal law sought a regulatory solution to restrict the use of substances or activities thought to
cause harm to human health or the environment. But these
laws only addressed highly visible examples of acute harm.
For example, one early law required the establishment of
safety standards to prevent steamship boilers from exploding. 9 In 1912, Congress passed the little known Esch-Hughes
Act which imposed a federal tax on white phosphorus for use
in match manufacturing. 10 Congress created this tax because
white phosphorus caused workers in match manufacturing
plants to suffer phosphorus necrosis, a disease that dissolved
their jaws into horribly disfigured mounds of puss, a problem
so horrendously visible that President Taft felt compelled to
address it in his State of the Union message in 1910.11
Other problems were neglected because society was totally unaware of the risks generated by new technologies,
particularly those that caused chronic harm only with long
latency periods. For example, both tetraethyl lead and
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were invented by the same chemist, Thomas Midgley. Both were considered remarkable technological advances at the time. Midgley himself had been
very concerned about health and safety. He tested thousands
7. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (emissions from a copper smelter located on the Tennessee side of the Georgia border
found to be a public nuisance with the Court subsequently issuing an injunction, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 237 U.S. 474 (1915)).
8. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921).
9. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots
and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1149 (1995).
10. See id. at 1150.
11. See id. at 1151. At the time, Congress did not believe it had the constitutional authority simply to ban the use of white phosphorus, so it used federal
taxing authority to respond to the problem.
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of compounds and rejected many because of safety concerns
before he settled on tetraethyl lead, not realizing that its incases of
troduction into gasoline would massively increase
12
decades.
several
next
the
over
poisoning
lead
CFCs were a remarkable advance because that greatly
improved the safety of refrigeration technology, which formerly had caused many deaths as a result of the unstable
chemicals that had been used in previous refrigerators. They
also greatly expanded society's capacity to preserve food and
to transport it safely over long distances. Yet, at that time no
one ever thought that CFCs ultimately would threaten to destroy our ozone layer. It was not until the early 1970s that,
almost entirely by accident, two scientists writing an environmental impact statement for the space shuttle came up with
a theoretical calculation showing that CFCs could in fact create a chemical reaction that would threaten to destroy the
13
ozone layer.
Earlier in this century, concerns about the health effects
of new technologies were addressed by convening conferences
of experts. For example, after dozens of workers died of lead
poisoning at the first tetraethyl lead plant, the public outcry
that ensued led to the convening of a Surgeon General's conference in 1923. This provided a forum for public health and
technology experts to consider whether the government
should ban the use of tetraethyl lead as a gasoline additive.
After quick studies of the health of workers at filling stations
that used leaded gasoline reached inconclusive results, tetraethyl lead was given a green light without any appreciation of
emission ultithe serious neurological damage that lead
14
scale.
massive
a
on
mately would generate
Beginning in the late 1960s, environmental law began a
swift transformation from a common law system to a regula12. This history is recounted in detail in SETH CAGIN & PHILIP DRAY, BECFCs CHANGED OUR WORLD AND ENDANGERED

TWEEN EARTH AND SKY: How
THE OZONE LAYER (1993).

13. RIcHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 10 (1991).
14. This experience is recounted in David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, A
'Gift of God"?: The Public Health Controversy over Leaded Gasolineduring the
1920s, 75 AMER. J. PUBL. HEALTH 344 (1985).
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tory one that relies on administrative agencies such as the
EPA. These agencies are authorized to issue regulations
designed to prevent harm before it occurs. However, as the
above examples illustrate, it often is difficult to forecast accurately the environmental effects of new substances or technologies. Thus, it was essential for courts to grant agencies
the leeway to act even in the face of considerable scientific
uncertainty.
This is illustrated by one of the landmark decisions in
environmental law, Ethyl Corporation v. EPA.15 In Ethyl,
fifty years after the introduction of tetraethyl lead into gasoline, the D.C. Circuit considered a challenge to EPA's first
regulations limiting the amount of lead that could be added
to gasoline. By a 2 - 1 vote the court initially struck down the
regulations. Lead poisoning was a widespread problem and
EPA could calculate that gasoline combustion released a tremendous amount of lead into the environment. However, the
majority of the three-judge panel held that EPA could not
limit the lead content of gasoline until it could prove that specific harm actually had occurred, harkening back to a common law standard of proof of causal injury. 16
The D.C. Circuit then took the case en banc and reversed
by the barest of margins: 5 - 4. The Court's en banc decision,
written by Judge J. Skelly Wright, concluded that it was not
necessary to show that actual harm had occurred before lead
additives could be regulated.' 7 Noting that precautionary
regulation would be "impossible" if courts demanded "rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect," the court held that
agencies could act to prevent harm even in the face of uncertainty by using the available evidence to make rational assessments concerning potential risks.18 The precautionary

principle reflected in this decision served as a model for fu15. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
16. See the discussion in Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 519-20
(8th Cir. 1975) (en banc). Articles critical of the initial panel decision are cited
in the D.C. Circuit's subsequent en banc decision in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 11 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
17. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
18. See id.
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ture federal regulatory policy. It also permitted regulators to
gather the data that later made a compelling case for removing all lead from gasoline. 19
Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court established
limits on the ability of agencies to engage in precautionary
regulation. In a 1980 case commonly referred to as the Benzene decision, the Court declared that it was not enough simply to find that a substance caused harm before regulating it
to the limit of feasibility. Instead, agencies first have to determine that the risks posed by a regulatory target are "significant" and that the contemplated regulatory action would
appreciably reduce them. 20 While the Court's decision was
embodied in a plurality opinion that addressed statutory language unique to the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), ultimately it has created a kind of federal common
law directing agencies to conduct quantitative risk assess21
ments prior to taking regulatory action.
While the Ethyl and Benzene decisions define the legal
contours of precautionary regulation, they do not provide a
clear answer to the quintessential question of modern regulatory policy: how much proof of harm is required before an
agency can regulate? While Ethyl indicates that agencies
need not wait for the kind of individualized proof of causal
injury that the common law would require, Benzene requires
them to do more than simply identify potential hazards - they
must quantify them, if possible, and determine that they are
significant and can be appreciably reduced. Whether this
would permit an agency to stop the introduction of yet an19. See ELLEN K. SILBERGELD AND ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ORGANOMETALS: IMPACT OF ACCIDENTAL ExPosuRE AND EXPERIMENTAL DATA ON REGULATORY POLICIES, IN NEUROTOXICANTS AND NEUROBIOLOGICAL FUNCTION (H.

Tilson & S. Sparber, eds. 1987).
20. See Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
21. In 1981, the Supreme Court clarified that agencies were not required to
base their regulatory decisions on the use of cost-benefit analysis. American
Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 488 (1981). However, the Benzene decision stimulated government agencies, including EPA, to
conduct quantitative risk assessments before imposing costly regulations on industries, substantially increasing the informational threshold for issuing environmental regulations.
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other toxic metal into gasoline without detailed proof concerning the adverse health effects of elevated ambient
22
concentrations of that substance remains in dispute today.
As a practical matter, the difficulties regulatory agencies
face in issuing standards has undermined environmental
law's promise of preventative regulation. Even in the absence of legislation requiring agencies to base decisions on
cost-benefit analysis, some federal courts have interpreted
existing regulatory statutes to place seemingly impossible analytical requirements on agencies. For example, EPA labored
for ten years to develop a comprehensive rule to phase out all
remaining uses of asbestos. 23 The agency decided that this
approach was far more efficient than continuing to try to prevent human exposure to asbestos throughout the life cycle of
products in which it is used because asbestos poses a substantial risk of life-threatening diseases even at very low
levels of exposure. EPA found that there were adequate substitutes available for most remaining uses of asbestos and
that substitutes would be developed for the others, in the face
of a technology-forcing regulation. 24 Despite EPA's extensive
cost-benefit analysis, the Fifth Circuit struck down this regulation on the ground that the agency had not analyzed all the
costs and benefits not only of an asbestos ban, but of all intermediate alternatives, 25 oblivious to the agency's conclusion
that only a phaseout could adequately control the risks. This
decision is widely viewed as a "death knell" for comprehensive preventative regulation on a multimedia basis under the
26
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).
22. See Kevin L. Fast, Treating Uncertainty as Risk: The Next Step in the
Evolution of EnvironmentalRegulation, 26 ENv. L. REP. 10627 (1996) (arguing
that EPA's use of safety factors in reference concentrations for assessing the
risks of allowing a manganese additive into gasoline shifts to a "guilty until
proven innocent" standard for toxic chemicals).
23. See Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution
in Commerce Prohibitions. 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460 (1989).
24. See id.
25. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229-30 (5th Cir.
1991).
26. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1996).
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Another significant initiative to overcome the chemicalby-chemical approach to regulation was struck down by the
Eleventh Circuit in a case known as the Air Contaminants
decision.2 7 This case involved the effort by OSHA during the
Bush administration to update in a comprehensive fashion its
400 permissible exposure limits for toxins in the workplace.
OSHA did not seek to adopt unreasonably stringent standards, but rather simply to bring its admittedly outdated regulations up to the levels of current industry consensus
standards. Yet the Eleventh Circuit held that OSHA must
perform individualized risk assessments for each chemical
and feasibility assessments for each industry subsector
before it could adopt such a regulation. 28 This decision erects
such a high informational threshold for regulation as to make
it virtually impossible for OSHA even to update the vast majority of its standards. 29 This further undermines the ability
of agencies to protect public health through preventative
regulation.
II.

Expertise, Public Perceptions, and Regulatory
Decisionmaking

Much of the current debate over risk regulation is a product of sharply different visions concerning the rationality of
public perceptions of environmental risk. Those who focus
largely on quantitative risk assessments argue that regulatory priorities are misplaced because the public is too concerned about some risks that are statistically smaller than
others.30 EPA's own expert risk assessors have found that
the agency's regulatory priorities are more closely aligned
with the relative -strength of public concerns over certain
risks than with the products of their comparative risk assess27. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
28. See id. at 975-76.
29. See Dennis J. Paustenbach, OSHA's Programfor Updating the Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs): Can Risk Assessment Help "Move the Ball Forward?", 5 RIsK IN PERSPECTIVE 1 (Jan. 1997).
30. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE REGULATION 20 (1993).
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ments. 31 Yet risk regulation choices implicate a far richer
mix of values than simple comparisons of statistical estimates of lives saved. These include the voluntariness of exposures to risks, fairness in the distribution of risks,
uncertainty, the potentially catastrophic nature of certain
risks, environmental damage and non-fatal health effects. 32
What is striking about this debate is that economists,
whose discipline traditionally has not questioned the rationality of consumer preferences, have been among the harshest
critics of the public's regulatory priorities.33 Rather than
viewing harmony between current regulatory priorities and
public preferences as a sign of a functioning, pluralistic democracy, these critics decry it as a misallocation of societal
resources because the public seemingly places a higher value
34
on controlling certain risks than cost-benefit analyses do.

This is not meant as an indictment of economics, for that discipline recently has made significant advances in developing
a richer understanding of the factors that shape consumer
preferences. Incorporating lessons from psychology and experimental studies,3 5 rational choice theory is moving away
from the traditional expected utility maximization model to31. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990).
32. See Victor B. Flatt, Should the Circle Be Unbroken?: A Review of the
Hon. Stephen Breyer's BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION, 24 ENV. L. 1707 (1994); Lisa Heinzerling, Political Science, 62
UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 449, 471 (1995); Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an
Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptionsof BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 295, 321 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Robert Hahn, Achieving Real Regulatory Reform, 1997 UNIV.
CHI. LEGAL FORUM (1997).

34. See id. While Hahn argues that the public would make different choices
if they were more aware of the true costs and benefits of regulation, he underestimates the degree to which estimates of the costs and benefits of regulation
were considered when regulatory legislation was adopted. See Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 UNIV.
CHI. LEGAL FORUM n.98 (1997).
35. See Cohn Camerer, BehavioralDecision Theory, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth, eds. 1995); Eldar
Hafir, Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION
11 (1993).
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ward one that understands the importance of context and endowment effects in shaping consumer values and
36
preferences.
Arguments that regulatory policy should place more
weight on quantitative analyses conducted by "experts" than
on the public's assessment of risks must appreciate the tremendous uncertainty that surrounds analyses of the prospective effects of regulation. Often it has proven to be the case
that risks are more serious than previously thought and that
the costs of regulation are far less than ex ante estimates.
There are numerous examples of these phenomena. At the
time of the Ethyl decision, the recommended safe level for
lead in childrens' blood was forty micrograms per deciliter.
Subsequently, it has been lowered to between ten and fifteen
micrograms per deciliter because scientists have learned a lot
more about the extent to which very low levels of lead can
cause neurological damage. 37 Scientists also discovered that
low levels of lead cause other types of health damage by increasing blood pressure in adult males. In addition, it is now
well known that the phaseout of lead additives in gasoline,
which was initiated by EPA during the Reagan Administration, cost far less than any ex ante estimate.
CFCs are another good example. A recent study estimates that there are 1.5 million fewer skin cancer cases each
year in the United States alone because of international action to phaseout the use of these substances. 38 At the same
time, the cost of complying with the phaseout has plunged
dramatically. In 1988, a partial phaseout of CFCs to a 50%
reduction, was estimated to cost about twice as much as an
estimate for an accelerated total phaseout of CFCs four years
later.39
36. See Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal Decision-Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUDIEs 287 (1996).

37. See ROBERT V.PERCIVAL
ENCE

ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, Sci-

& POLICY 631 (2d ed. 1996).

38. See Harry Slaper et al., Estimates of Ozone Depletion and Skin Cancer
Incidence to Examine the Vienna Convention Achievements, 384 NATURE 256
(1996).
39. See Percival, et al., supra note 37, at 1282.
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More recently, the ex-post cost-benefit analyses that have
been conducted of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 40 suggest that there have been enormous societal benefits that
were not appreciated at the time the legislation was adopted
despite the vocal opposition of many economists. One example of how the costs of the 1990 CAAA have proven to be far
less than originally estimated is provided by the emissions
allowances for sulfur dioxide, which the CAAA allow to be
traded in the open market. When Congress decided to adopt
the system of emissions allowance trading, it was estimated
by industry that it would cost about $1000 - $1500 per ton to
reduce sulfur dioxide emissions. Now that emissions allowances are trading on the open market, they are selling for
around $100 per ton.
It is not surprising that society frequently underestimates prospective risks while overestimating prospective
costs. Estimates of risk depend upon what risks are assessed. Until there is a reason to suspect that a substance or
activity might create certain kinds of risks, such as the risk
CFCs posed to the ozone layer or the effect of lead on blood
pressure, prospective risk assessments have no reason to consider such effects. With respect to the costs of regulation,
business interests have a tremendous incentive to avoid regulations that may increase their costs. Thus, they often engage in strategic behavior to forestall regulation by
exaggerating estimates of the likely costs of regulation.
Moreover, until regulations actually are adopted and implemented, there is little incentive for developing new technology that would reduce the cost of complying with more
stringent environmental standards. 41
Opportunities for public policy to intervene to protect
against risks are episodic and often depend on seemingly random political factors that make particular risks salient regulatory targets at certain moments in time. When this occurs,
prospective estimates of risks and costs should be viewed as
40. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA), Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104
Stat. 2399 (1990).
41. See Finkel, supra note 32, at 369-71.
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dynamic and subject to revision over time, rather than as the
foundation for one-time, all-or-nothing regulatory decisions.
Ultimately, an even-handed regulatory policy that seeks to
improve the public's understanding of risks and the costs of
controlling them may offer the best hope for improving regulatory priorities by influencing what issues command policy42
makers' attention.
Despite criticism of the public's risk perceptions, people
are becoming more sophisticated in their attitudes toward
risk. The concern of the hostages held at the Japanese embassy in Peru over second-hand smoke is well founded, as
confirmed by recent studies. 43 Indeed, the current remarkable groundswell of concern over the risks of smoking and the
role of tobacco companies in promoting this deadly addiction
paints a brighter picture concerning the public's capacity to
absorb information about environmental risk, particularly
when responsible government policy seeks to play a leadership role in informing public opinion. 44
One may legitimately question who the real "experts"
are. Rather than a high priesthood of quantitative risk assessors, the public may do a better job of assessing some risks
and it may respond more quickly than the regulatory system
when information about risks becomes available. The history
of CFC regulation demonstrates that it was the public who
simply stopped buying aerosol spray cans, propelling the
United States to deal with that risk in the early 1970s, a decision that proved remarkably prescient. 45 In similar fashion,
the environmental groups who pushed for elimination of lead
42. See Robert V. Percival, The Ecology of Environmental Conflict: Risk,
Uncertainty and the Transformation of Environmental Policy Disputes, 12
STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 209 (1992) (discussing how environmental policy disputes get on the public agenda and means for improving the public's understanding of environmental risk issues).
43. Denise Grady, Study Finds Secondhand Smoke Doubles Risk of Heart
Disease, NEW YORK TIMES, May 20, 1997, at Al.
44. Kevin Sack, For the Nation's Politicians,Big Tobacco No Longer Bites,
NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 22, 1997, at Al.
45. See Joby Warrick, DisasterAverted, Experts Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 21,
1996, at A2 (reporting on study finding that phaseout of ozone-depleting substances has prevented 1.5 million cases of skin cancer each year in the United
States alone).
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from gasoline in the early 1970s could be considered more
"expert" in their armchair risk assessments because they advocated something that took nearly two decades to accomplish, but which is now widely viewed as one of the most
dramatic environmental success stories. Progress toward improved public confidence in our regulatory system will only
continue if we continue to pursue a pluralistic approach to
public policy that affords the public substantial input into decisions concerning how to respond to environmental risks. It
will not occur if we move instead toward a system that empowers a group of so-called experts insulated from the political process to decide how to respond to risk.
III. Emerging Trends in Regulatory Policy
Regulatory policy appears to be moving in several positive directions. Concern that regulatory policy often is inflexible and unfair in its application 46 has spawned efforts to
"reinvent regulation" and other initiatives that are moving
regulatory policy toward some of the values that animated its
common law roots. Regulators are exhibiting a greater willingness to modify standard default assumptions in risk assessments in circumstances where they can be shown to be
inappropriate. 47 They are now focusing more on fairness to
individuals, particularly individuals who are the most sensitive to environmental risks. 48 As a result of the growing "en46. See Philip K Howard, THE DEATH

OF COMMON SENSE:

How LAw

IS SUF-

FOCATING AMERICA (1994).

47. A report released by the Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk
Management in June, 1996 recommends a system where it will be possible, in
certain circumstances, to relax some of the default assumptions that typically
go into risk assessments, if it can be demonstrated that there are good reasons
in an individual case for believing that the normal assumptions about extrapolating from animal tests to humans are not valid. Michael Baram, Risky Business, 104 ENVTL. HEALTH PERsp. 1040 (1996).
48. For example, the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-170,
110 Stat. 1489 (1996), requires EPA to give special attention to the risks of
sensitive populations such as children exposed to pesticides. See James D. Wilson, Resolving the "Delaney Paradox," RESOURCES 14 (Fall 1996). It also requires EPA to assess the risks of endocrine disruption, a growing concern
among scientists. In April 1997, President Clinton issued an executive order
directing all federal agencies to identify and address environmental risks that
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vironmental justice" movement, regulatory policy is becoming
those
more concerned over how to protect (and compensate)
49
upon whom risk is disproportionately concentrated.
One of the most encouraging trends is the growing recognition that regulation is only one of a larger set of tools society can use to manage environmental risks. Common law
liability, market forces, and environmental regulation are
highly complementary mechanisms for helping society cope
with risk. Each has its distinct advantages and drawbacks.
Thus, the best strategy for society to address the portfolio of
risks it faces is to employ the three in a combination that emphasizes the strengths of each.
Market forces can play an important role in protecting
human health by generating economic incentives for minimizing involuntary exposure to risk, particularly in circumstances where consumers are informed of risks and can
choose to avoid them by altering their consumption behavior.50 While our current regulatory infrastructure emerged in
response to the perceived inadequacies of the common law for
responding to environmental risk, common law principles
also retain enormous vitality in society's overall risk reduction policy, as Professor Marshall Shapo explains. 5 1 The common law reflects social judgments concerning the morality
and efficiency of activities that affect others 5 2 and it enables
judges to assess the reasonableness of risks despite the enormous uncertainties that bedevil quantitative risk assessmay disproportionately affect children. Exec. Order No. 13,045, 62 Fed. Reg.
19,885 (1997). This order creates an interagency Task Force on Environmental
Health Risks and Safety Risks to Children to advise the President on how to
respond to such risks.
49. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (1994).
50. Regulatory policy is now seeking to enhance the power of the marketplace by requiring far more extensive public disclosures of information concerning potential risks. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050, and the toxic release inventory it created now
provide the public with unprecedented information about releases of toxic
chemicals.
51. Marshall S. Shapo, Tort Law and Environmental Risk, 14 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 801 (1997).
52. Jonathan Bender, Societal Risk Reduction: Promise and Pitfalls, 3
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 255, 266-67 (1995).
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ment. 53 While the common law generally looks backward in
assessing the reasonableness of events that already have
transpired, 5 4 these judgments can have a powerful effect in
shaping future conduct by articulating what society considers
to be reasonable. When regulators neglect to control risky activities that cause widespread harm, the common law is society's primary vehicle for responding, as illustrated by the
asbestos tragedy5 5 and the recent flurry of litigation against
56
the tobacco industry.
IV.

Conclusion

Public demand to prevent involuntary exposure to risk
has produced a comprehensive set of environmental laws that
authorize agencies to issue preventative regulations. While
regulatory policy has fallen short of the law's promise of comprehensive protection, transferring greater regulatory authority to experts insulated from public pressure would not
ensure improved policy, but could undermine public confidence in the regulatory system. Recent developments appear
to be moving us towards a regulatory system that places
more emphasis on regulatory fairness and more individualized determinations of risk. This moves environmental regulation closer to some of the values that animated common law
standards, while seeking to preserve the benefits of preventative regulation. These and other developments are amplifying the complementary nature of the common law, market
53. See Shapo, supra note 51.
54. To be sure, the common law does have doctrines of anticipatory nuisance, but the difficulty of forecasting environmental damage has meant that,
for the most part, common law liability attaches only after harm has become
manifest.
55. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos
- Carnage, Cover-up and Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1693, 1695 (1986)
(describing the tort system "as the uniquely effective means of exposing and
defeating the asbestos conspiracy, providing compensation to victims and deterring future malfeasance.")
56. The long history of the tobacco industry's successful efforts to avoid effective regulation is discussed in detail in RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES:
AMERIcA's HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS (1996).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/3
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forces and environmental regulation as mechanisms for controlling environmental risk.
As this essay goes to press, the pluralistic nature of society's response to environmental risk is being illustrated in
dramatic fashion by the tobacco industry's stunning decision
57
to agree to a $368 billion settlement of liability claims.
While the fine print is just beginning to surface, the magnitude of the proposed settlement reaffirms the common law's
vitality as a vehicle for addressing risks that had escaped effective regulation. 5 8 Moreover, a veritable sea change in public opinion toward the tobacco industry may illustrate how
responsible government policy can help shape public attitudes towards risk. With improved public understanding,
regulatory policy is capable of amplifying the power of common law liability and market forces to protect against environmental risks, creating additional opportunities for
improving the fairness and efficiency of public policy.

57. John M. Broder, Cigarette Makers in a $368 Billion Accord to Curb
Lawsuits and CurtialMarketing, NEW YORK TIMES, June 21, 1997, at Al.
58. Perhaps the most revealing index of the common law's power is the
enormous energy that has been expended on behalf of efforts to restrict tort
liability. Indeed, the proposed tobacco settlement has forced advocates of such
"tort reform" measures to scramble to modify them for fear that they would
insulate the industry from liability that it was now willing to accept. See Suein
L. Hwang, Deal Is Close in Tobacco Negotiations, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1997, at
A3 (reporting an effort in Congress to exclude tobacco products from proposed
legislation to cap punitive damages in response to concerns expressed by 16
state attorneys general that it would undercut their negotiating position in the
tobacco settlement talks). In June 1997, California, which had enacted legislation giving the tobacco industry immunity from products liability suits, repealed the law and joined 36 other states in suing the industry. Milo Geyelin,
Californiais 37th and Biggest State to Sue Tobacco Industry for Costs, WALL ST.
J., June 13, 1997, at B9.
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